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PSB D-33

August 28, 1952

THE PROBLEM

1. To take maximum advantage of the weaknesses of Stalinism and Dialectical Materialism in our attacks on the Soviet Regime and, whenever possible, use the contradictions and lack of logic thereof as levers to harass the Soviet regime and negate its appeal to those outside the Iron Curtain.

DISCUSSION

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2. A study of the field of doctrinal warfare shows relatively little action on the part of the United States. With the except-

there is no planned effort in this area. This, in effect, means that while we have theoretically passed from the policy of presenting "a full and fair picture" as our attack on the Soviet Union, we are in truth still using this approach.

3. If our efforts are limited to this - and to sporadic attacks on manifestations of the Soviet doctrine - while the basic tenets thereof are allowed to be published, explained, and distributed with no real effort to counter them, our attacks are doomed to failure. No system can afford the luxury of being so objective that it permits its antithesis to overcome it - and doctrinally, that is what we are doing.

4. There are arguments that to reverse this policy would be difficult. Among these the ones most often put forth are the following:

- a. We can't match the skill of the Soviets in this field.
- b. The Soviet people are not susceptible to this type approach.
- c. Doctrine approach is immaterial because the Soviet regime is completely opportunistic in its methods.
- d. We are doing all that needs to be done at the present time.

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5. The first three sub-paragraphs above, for the most part, are not arguments but "intuitive" reasoning. They do not take into account the problems of Asia, Europe, Africa; in fact, all of the world presently not under Soviet rule or domination, nor the ability which the U. S. might develop in this field. The last sub-paragraph is patently untrue as shown by a recent informal survey conducted in Europe. If we are to survive we must both:

- a. Present an objective and dynamic picture of our system and,
- b. Refute and destroy the false claims of Soviet doctrine.

CONCLUSIONS

6. There is an urgent need to establish a panel in PSB to study this problem and come up with recommendations for its solution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That such a panel be authorized by the Board; that the terms of reference of this panel in brief shall be as given below:

a. Composition - One member each from State, CIA, Defense, with a steering member from PSB. These members must be competent in the field of Soviet Doctrine and so accepted by their departments or agencies.

b. Task - To examine the field of ideological warfare, specifically as directed against Soviet doctrine and to make recommendations as to how the United States can gain superiority in this field. This to include specific recommendations for:

- (1) Policy recommendations to the departments and agencies.
- (2) Planning responsibilities on operational levels.
- (3) Media production and emphasis with recommendations as to whether, in each case, this should be executed by private enterprise.

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8. In addition to, or in lieu of the above should it not be acceptable, it is desired that PSB make a statement that Doctrinal warfare is a legitimate field of interest and endeavor for U. S. agencies or departments.

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